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Trends in Communist Propaganda

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV TRIP POSTPONEMENT ANNOUNCED DURING FAHMI VISIT

Neither Moscow nor Cairo has thus far offered any reason for the definite postponement of Brezhnev's scheduled mid-January visits to Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The postponement was announced first on 30 December by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, followed by TASS and Cairo radio. The only Damascus report has been a Syrian news agency item on the 30th that a letter from Brezhnev was delivered to President al-Asad "last night." Thus far, both Moscow and Cairo have emphasized that the decision does not affect their relations, which are proceeding on course, and have sought to deflect speculation about discord.

FAHMI VISIT TO MOSCOW The postponement of Brezhnev's visit would seem not to have been anticipated in Cairo when Foreign Minister Fahmi and newly appointed War Minister al-Jamasi were invited on short notice to Moscow for talks. Cairo media saw that visit as part of preparations for Brezhnev's trip. But TASS on the 27th, announcing the Fahmi visit, significantly avoided any reference to Brezhnev's impending Middle East tour. The TASS announcement said only that the Egyptians would be arriving on the 28th for "an exchange of views on matters of interest," phraseology repeated in TASS reports on the talks between the two sides on the 28th and 30th.

The last known Moscow mention of the Brezhnev tour came in a foreign-language commentary dealing with Cairo press treatment of the Brezhnev visit, broadcast on the 23d and 24th. Also on the 24th, PRAVDA carried a Cairo-dated TASS report citing the weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF as refuting "those circles trying to discredit" the USSR's stand in support of the Arabs and hailing the forthcoming Brezhnev visit as designed to "resurrect the former traditions" on which Soviet-Egyptian cooperation were based. Up to 23 December, Moscow's Arabic-language broadcasts had carried virtually daily features and commentaries building up the Brezhnev visit. Since then, broadcasts to Arab listeners have continued to carry typical features on Soviet assistance to Arab projects and Soviet-Arab cooperation without making any reference to Brezhnev.

By contrast, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY had reported on 26 December that President as-Sadat had that day received an "urgent" message from Brezhnev, and the following day announced

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that in response to Brezhnev's invitation Fahmi and al-Jamasi would go to Moscow on the 28th for discussions centering on "preparations for the Brezhnev visit." Fahmi himself, in statements on arrival in Moscow and at a Gromyko dinner the same evening, was reported by Cairo radio as saying that as-Sadat was looking forward to Brezhnev's visit. TASS in reporting the dinner said merely that Gromyko and Fahmi exchanged "friendly toasts."

Cairo media on the 29th continued to depict the Moscow talks as an indication of Soviet-Egyptian concern to make the Brezhnev visit "positive" and "a great success." AL-AKHBAR's chief editor Musa Sabri was moved to observe that according to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, never before had a visit to Egypt by an important guest been preceded by "such huge, precise and diverse preparations" as this one. Cairo radio commentaries on the 28th and 29th had acknowledged the existence of differences between "friends," but expressed optimism about rapprochement-- at the same time affirming Egypt's "balanced" foreign policy of seeking good relations with East and West.

The watershed apparently came with Brezhnev's 45-minute meeting with Fahmi and al-Jamasi on the 29th. Characterizing the talks as "friendly," TASS said "views were exchanged" on further development of all-round cooperation and strengthening of friendship, Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet "aid and support" for the Arabs, and the Egyptians expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its "principled and friendly stand" of support for the Arab cause. Cairo radio's report on the meeting cited Egyptian delegation sources as calling it cordial and positive, and was notably silent on the Brezhnev visit; AL-AKHBAR on the 30th reported that the visit "was the subject of discussion" and an "important statement" concerning it would be issued.

POSTPONEMENT Moscow's handling of the announcement has
ANNOUNCEMENT suggested that no explanation of the decision
 will be forthcoming. The brief announcement,
carried by TASS and Moscow's domestic service, said understanding
had been reached to postpone Brezhnev's visits and that new
dates, reciprocally acceptable to all sides, "will be agreed on
later." In effect diluting the impact of the announcement,
Moscow radio's Arabic-language service broadcast an item combining
the postponement decision with a TASS report on Brezhnev's
meeting with the visiting Egyptian ministers. TASS' review
of the 31 December PRAVDA also gave the announcement short
shrift: Noting that the paper published the joint statement

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on the Egyptian delegation's visit, TASS cited the statement's final sentence on the "positive results" of these talks. Almost as an afterthought, TASS tucked in the observation that "PRAVDA writes that Leonid Brezhnev's visits to Egypt, Syria and Iraq have been put off." Subsequent Soviet comment has made no mention of the decision.

JOINT STATEMENT A terse, four-paragraph final statement on the Fahmi visit, issued by TASS and the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 30th, noted that "questions of bilateral relations" had been discussed. These relations were wrapped up in a final sentence asserting that the talks, held in an atmosphere "characteristic of the firm friendship" between the two states and peoples, "produced positive results." There was no mention of the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which had been called the basis of Soviet-Egyptian "friendship and all-round cooperation" in the Soviet report on the last Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting on 15 October.

The joint statement devoted two paragraphs to the Geneva conference, twice stressing the need for "early resumption" of the conference. Similarly, the final statement on Fahmi's October visit to Moscow had urged resumption of the Geneva talks "at the earliest date."* And as in October, the sides again supported participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at Geneva. The joint statement said the sides consider the Geneva conference the suitable venue for examining "all aspects" of a Middle East settlement and adopting "appropriate decisions" leading to the establishment of peace. This is not inconsistent with views expressed by President as-Sadat on the Geneva talks: In an Iranian press interview in mid-December he explained that Geneva was the place to "seek lasting peace" and "prepare for a peace agreement." But in the interview he also indicated his receptiveness to the U.S. approach. He declared that he "agreed with both" the U.S. theory of a step-by-step process and the Soviet theory of reconvening the Geneva conference immediately.

* Moscow commentators have continued to harp on the need for reconvening the Geneva conference and to warn against the pitfalls of "separate agreements" and "quiet diplomacy," but these points have appeared in Soviet comment for months and would not necessarily reflect a quarrel with Egypt over U.S. versus Soviet approaches to the procedure for a settlement.

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If the United States could achieve progress through its approach he would welcome it, he said; if not, "we will go to Geneva in accordance with the Soviet theory." He pointed out that "the Americans also do not exclude Geneva. All of us will go to Geneva."

MOSCOW COMMENT In minimal comment on the Soviet-Egyptian talks, Moscow has argued that peace and social progress in the Middle East "largely depend" on the strength of Soviet-Arab cooperation. In a slightly defensive tone reminiscent of comment during past periods of strained Soviet-Egyptian relations, Moscow has again complained that "at every critical turn" in modern Arab history, friendship with the Soviet Union became the first target of subversion by "inside and outside reactionaries." Expressing this view, a Gerasimov commentary broadcast to Africa on the 30th observed that in an atmosphere of increased detente it was "all the more intolerable" that Israel and "outside imperialist circles" were trying to hamper a Mideast settlement through military provocations and "separate deals." An Arabic-language commentary on the 30th, extolling the Soviet attitude of welcoming every step toward a Mideast settlement "including the disengagement of forces" in Sinai and on the Golan Heights, found it no coincidence that while Egyptian ministers were visiting Moscow, Western papers were "again publishing provocative fabrications on the nature of Soviet-Egyptian relations." And TASS political commentator Kornilov, in an article the same day, singled out "measures toward strengthening the defense capacity" of the Arab states as occupying a "special place" in Soviet-Arab relations, and went on to charge the Western press with "indulging in all kinds of speculations about the state and prospects" of Soviet-Arab relations.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW CONTINUES TO HIT TRADE BILL, UNSPECIFIC ON RESPONSE

Moscow has continued in routine comment to criticize the restrictive provisions in the new U.S. trade bill, but still refrains from giving any explicit indication that it is contemplating any specific counteraction. To the extent that the comment has touched on the possible future consequences of the U.S. legislative action, it has been limited to ambiguous predictions that the sponsors of the restrictive legislation would suffer politically and that the United States would lose its competitive edge as a trading partner of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, year-end reviews carried in various Soviet media have presented generally favorable assessments of the past year's developments in U.S.-Soviet relations and projected optimistic prospects for 1975.

ZAMYATIN ARTICLE The most authoritative Soviet comment since the TASS statement of 18 December was an article in SOVIET RUSSIA on 28 December by TASS Director General Leonid Zamyatin. It begins with a favorable assessment of the development of U.S.-Soviet relations, which it ascribes to the "mutual" efforts of both governments, but quickly shifts to what it describes as a darker side of the picture: the efforts of forces in the United States to brake this development. It identifies the obstructionist forces as the opponents of U.S.-Soviet trade, who are led, it says, by the "Senator from Boeing," Jackson. It goes on to dilate on the political aspirations of Senator Jackson, and implies that his purpose in tying the trade bill to conditions affecting Jewish emigration is to curry favor with Jewish voters in the United States.

In characterizing the amendments attached to the trade bill, Zamyatin uses language clearly calculated to carry an ominous ring. He says they impose restrictions that are "many times worse" than those embodied in the old legislation. Unlike the old restrictions, which were frankly commercial, these "touch upon the political sphere" and by their substance call for "interference in the internal affairs of other states." He goes on to deny that the Soviet Union had made any deal affecting Jewish emigration to insure passage of the trade bill, asserting that Senator Jackson had tried to present a "distorted idea of the Soviet position" in this respect.

The portion of the article which comes closest to implying a Soviet political response to the trade bill concerns the 1972 agreement, which, it says, provided that each side would grant the other

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"unconditionally" most favored nation status. The word "unconditionally" was underlined. The article went on to say that the "non-fulfillment of assumed commitments by one side must, of course, also affect the commitments of the other side" While this appears to carry an implied threat of retaliatory action, the only explanation of what the action might be is contained in a subsequent passage which points out that the restrictions in the trade bill would reduce the competitiveness of American firms in comparison with the Soviet Union's other trading partners. Thus the threat appears to come down to a prediction that the Soviet Union may proceed more selectively than otherwise in negotiating trade contracts with U.S. firms.

OTHER COMMENT Other commentaries have repeated in milder language the substance of these themes. Senator Jackson has come in for some of the sharpest attacks he has suffered in some time, although he has long been a favorite target of Soviet commentators. The notion that his action on the trade bill was prompted by political considerations has been particularly stressed. The idea that the trade bill would make the United States less competitive than other Western countries as a trading partner for the Soviet Union has also been stressed frequently. Brezhnev's remarks on this theme, made in a Kremlin speech at a reception for Treasury Secretary Simon in mid-October, have been recalled in this connection.

In the meantime, the year-end reviews of the international situation carried in various Soviet media have more than counterbalanced the negative tone of the comment on the trade bill. Typical was the Moscow radio international observers roundtable on 29 December which described the year's results as having "deepened the fundamental reversal" that had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations and as giving grounds for viewing the future with "optimism."

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VIETNAM

DRV GENERALS SUGGEST CAUTIOUS STRATEGY IN COMING YEAR

Hanoi media have offered the most comprehensive discussion of military policy since the January 1973 peace agreement with the publication of lengthy articles by the only two DRV senior generals, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung.* Both articles were written to mark the occasion of the 22 December 30th anniversary of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) and received wide publicity, broadcast by Hanoi radio and published in Hanoi's daily papers as well as in the December issues of the leading monthly army and party journals--TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and HOC TAP. Not surprisingly, neither article directly discusses North Vietnam's military intentions in the near future; however, the tone and content of Giap's discussion of strategy and Dung's preoccupation with meeting DRV economic needs suggest that Hanoi is not ready to commit forces to drastically change the situation in South Vietnam during the coming year but will continue the retrenchment and rebuilding of forces begun after the January 1973 peace agreement. At the same time, however, both articles reaffirm Hanoi's commitment to taking control in the South and raise the possibility of changes in strategy at any time to meet new developments.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES Van Tien Dung wrestled with the question of coordinating the development of the DRV military forces with the reconstruction of the North Vietnamese economy, noting in the course of his article that meeting the dual requirements of the economy and defense can give rise to "many problems" concerning the investment of capital, manpower, and time. His article is additional evidence of Hanoi's efforts to balance the demands on its limited resources and formulate priorities for the coming year and for the five-year plan which will begin in 1976. An editorial in the August issue of the party journal HOC TAP had broached the same subject, maintaining that a strong national

* Giap's last major article, an installment in a four-part article begun in December 1971, was published in the fall of 1972. North Vietnamese journals have published two lengthy talks by Dung since the peace agreement, one in August 1974 discussing the modernization of the armed forces and another in December 1973 analyzing "the art of military campaigns"--see the TRENDS of 25 September 1974, pages 12-14, for a discussion of these talks.

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defense was dependent on a strong economy and calling for the development of a "national defense consolidation plan" and the gradual achievement of "an equilibrium between economic requirements and national defense requirements."

Dung echoed the dual approach of the HOC TAP editorial, maintaining that "our people must have powerful military forces, and in order to have powerful military forces and a powerful national defense system, our people must have a strong economy." Such a formulation, subordinating the national defense requirements to the economy during peacetime, is consistent with past North Vietnamese dogma and does not rule out a sudden shift in priorities. Thus, for example, an article by Giap in the February 1972 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN--just prior to the 1972 communist offensive--traced the party's policy on building national defense in peacetime back to the 12th Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) plenum in March 1957 and explained the balance of priorities in a similar fashion:

In peacetime circumstances our people's primary mission consists of concentrating forces for building the country and the socialist economy. Therefore, a very basic problem in building up the army and consolidating national defense in this era is that of correctly solving the relationship between the economy and national defense. Only by having a firm and strong economy can we have a firm and strong national defense. Conversely, only by having a firm and strong national defense can we protect our people's peaceful labor and national construction activities

Speaking on this same question before the Third VWP Congress in September 1960, Giap had gone much further than current comment in emphasizing economic priorities. Not only did he identify economic construction as the party's "central task," but he stated that it was necessary to reduce the national defense budget and army strength in order to concentrate manpower and resources on the economy. Hanoi comment since the peace agreement has given no such indication that cutbacks in the military area are contemplated, although it is likely that there has been debate on this issue. Hanoi's leading economic planner, Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, cryptically touched on the problem earlier this year, in an article in the 14 March NHAN DAN, when he warned that we should not be "too bent on maintaining vigilance and making preparations for war, and thus become unsteady and undecided in mobilizing all our forces and

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latent capabilities" for economic restoration. Dung may have been responding to pressure for cuts in military spending when, in his current article, he noted that national defense involves necessary expenditures but cautioned against unnecessary waste in the name of defense.

Dung called for coordination between economic construction and consolidation of national defense in the course of formulating plans and warned that coordination must not be delayed until plans are drafted, a point which had also been made in the August HOC TAP. Underscoring "difficulties" North Vietnam faces in the "very urgent" task of economic restoration and the "very heavy" task of national defense consolidation, Dung called upon the armed forces to "actively and positively coordinate with various economic branches in setting forth guidelines, duties, and measures to meet the national defense requirements" and to "clearly grasp the practical capabilities of our national economy so as to set forth appropriate needs and join in overcoming all difficulties." The HOC TAP editorial had similarly called upon military agencies at various levels to provide the economic sector with concrete data on national defense needs. And the current Giap article, while covering a much broader range of subjects than Dung's, also noted that "our effort to coordinate economy with national defense must be reflected in all economic policies, lines, and plans and in all general economic activities."

WAR PREPARATION While Dung did not contest the priorities set forth in the August HOC TAP editorial, he did go further than the journal in explicitly indicating that the current priorities may well be shifted suddenly with a change in the military situation. Thus, for example, while acknowledging that the building of the economy currently has precedence over defense, he added that "in another period, because the situation is critical, we may also have to concentrate our efforts on meeting all the requirements of national defense and of the war" and only give secondary attention to building the economy.

Elsewhere in the article Dung spelled out this possibility in graphic terms, observing that "when war breaks out, we must take the initiative in rapidly shifting the people's economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing," avoiding "chaos that usually follows the outbreak of war." Specifically, he advocated the establishment of reserves of food and materials, the experimental production of defense goods which would be produced in the event of war, and planning for wartime production and distribution, air defense, and evacuation.

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STRATEGY A large portion of the Vo Nguyen Giap article was a replay of the defense minister's longstanding views on "people's war." Among other things, he restated basic tenets which he had discussed at length in an article 5 years ago on the army's 25th anniversary, a period of reduced military activity, leaving the impression that Hanoi is again biding its time in its efforts to achieve its goals in South Vietnam, awaiting a propitious opportunity. He reiterated basic rules of protracted warfare--"we need time to annihilate the enemy bit by bit, to defeat his strategies one by one, to repel him step by step, to gradually shift the balance of forces between us and the enemy, and to win partial victories while proceeding toward total victory"--but he also noted that objective conditions could change and give rise to "favorable opportunities" to "achieve great victories." Giap had described a similar protracted strategy in December 1969 and had also provided for more spectacular efforts, noting that in the process of a long war "when the war moves from one phase to another, there often are fluctuations by leaps and bounds as a result either of our efforts, of the enemy's mistakes, or of objective conditions."

Repeating another theme from the 1969 article, Giap's current article noted that, while following an offensive strategic concept, "at times and in given areas, the revolutionary war may be on the defensive." As he had maintained in 1969, he added that this defensive stage "is only a fleeting and temporary condition pending the creation of conditions for the revolutionary war to resume the offensive." The notion that the revolution occasionally assumed a defensive posture had been raised earlier, in the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive, in a report by Politburo member Truong Chinh, publicized in August 1968. The same theme was repeated by First Secretary Le Duan in his programmatic February 1970 article.

Evaluating the current balance of forces, Giap maintained that "the revolutionary forces in our country are demonstrably more powerful than the counterrevolutionary forces"--a characterization which is more positive than the usual less definite line, voiced for example in the August HOC TAP editorial, that the balance has changed in favor of the revolution. He also reiterated a formulation raised by Hanoi just prior to the 1972 spring offensive, claiming: "We are in an ascending position, whereas the enemy is in a descending posture." While maintaining that this "inevitable trend" is a "firm basis" for achieving "complete victory," he did not go on, as comment did in 1972, to advocate main force attacks to create a clear-cut change in the balance of forces.*

* For a discussion of the comment in 1972, see the TRENDS of 29 March and 12 April 1972.

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SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF KULIKOV HOLDS TALKS IN HANOI

Communist media have predictably provided little information on the substance of the 21-27 December visit to the DRV of a Soviet military delegation led by First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff V.G. Kulikov.* The visit was timed to coincide with celebration of the Vietnamese army's 30th anniversary and Hanoi media duly reported the group's attendance at anniversary festivities and other activities, including the usual banquets and visits to military facilities and museums. However, VNA gave no indication what topics were raised in the delegation's talks with North Vietnamese military counterparts on the 24th and with Premier Pham Van Dong on the 26th, noting only that there was an atmosphere of "friendship and fraternal militant solidarity."

The full composition of the Soviet delegation has not been reported in available communist media, with radio and news agency reports listing only Kulikov and military attache Colonel Legostayev by name. The Vietnamese military officers taking part in the talks have been reported, however, and provide some indication of the nature of the consultations: VNA reported that the military participants included Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, lieutenant generals Tran Quy Hai, Tran Sam, Le Quang Hoa, and Le Trong Tan, and major generals Phung The Tai and Vu Xuan Chiem. Both Tran Quy Hai and Tran Sam had participated in talks with the last high-level Soviet military delegation visiting Hanoi in March 1972.

Tran Sam has extensive experience in military aid negotiations, most recently having participated in the talks on a Soviet aid agreement--signed in the USSR on 8 December--which Hanoi, but not Moscow, said included military assistance. Le Quang Hoa is deputy chief of the General Political Department and headed the DRV military delegation to the four-party Joint Military Commission in Saigon in early 1973. Le Trong Tan is not known to have appeared publicly in North Vietnam for some 10 years and may have been present to brief the Soviet delegates on the current military situation in South Vietnam. Phung The Tai, a deputy chief of staff, also participated in the March 1972 talks with the Soviet military representatives; he commanded the DRV air and air defense forces from 1964 to 1967. Vu Xuan Chiem is a deputy chief of the VPA Rear Services General Department.

* The last Soviet military delegation to North Vietnam, led by Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces Marshal P.F. Batitskiy, was on 26-27 March 1972. First Deputy Minister of Defense S.L. Sokolov visited Hanoi on 3-7 October 1971.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING ASSAILS VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AS "SCRAP OF PAPER"

A 27 December PEOPLE'S DAILY article by prominent Chinese foreign affairs commentator Jen Ku-ping has offered Peking's first assessment of the strategic arms accord reached at the Vladivostok summit, claiming that this "scrap of paper" merely sets new guidelines for an intensified U.S.-Soviet arms race in the quest for nuclear superiority. Jen avoided any explicit mention of the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and Brezhnev, but harshly criticized recent "big noise" about the U.S.-Soviet agreement setting a quota on strategic arms, observing that the accord in fact allows for wide qualitative and quantitative expansion of both powers' nuclear weapons.

The article focused on discrediting a basic premise of SALT--that nuclear balance will help avert the danger of nuclear war and relax the international situation--and claimed that neither power is actually striving for balance. The commentator said that both the United States and Soviet Union view nuclear weapons as their "lifeline," and that each is merely using paper agreements to restrict the other and gain the upper hand. Acknowledging that the strengths of the two powers may now appear equal, Jen quoted Mao's dictum that this is a temporary phenomenon and the "basic situation is imbalance." He underscored this point by describing how the Soviet Union, with an advantage in the quantity of nuclear weapons, has endeavored to overcome the U.S. qualitative and technological superiority, while the United States has concurrently attempted to check the Soviet advantage while enhancing its own strongpoints.

BACKGROUND The article caps a recent spate of Chinese comment in the wake of the Vladivostok meeting designed to show that behind the "smokescreen" of detente lies ever intensifying U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Though Peking has directly mentioned the summit meeting only in passing, it has carried frequent reports indicating increased U.S.-Soviet competition over strategic arms, naval development, Europe, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and economic development. This conforms generally with the Chinese practice at the time of the June-July Nixon-Brezhnev summit.*

* For discussion of Peking's response to that summit, see the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 9-10.

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Last July, however, Peking more openly discussed the role of the U.S. President and Secretary Kissinger in reporting evidence of U.S. rivalry with and opposition to the USSR. Thus, the Nixon trips to the Middle East and to West Europe prior to the Moscow summit and the Kissinger visit to Western Europe after the summit were billed as thinly disguised U.S. efforts to strengthen the Western position in these strategic areas against suspected Soviet encroachment. By contrast, Peking this time has not portrayed President Ford or Kissinger as strong rivals to Moscow, but has instead played up opposition to the USSR from lower-ranking officials of the Ford Administration and from Congress. Peking's sole reference to President Ford's stance vis-a-vis Moscow since the summit has been a brief reference in an 18 December NCNA report on superpower competition in the Indian Ocean, which recalled the President's remarks last summer regarding the presence of Soviet Indian Ocean bases as justifying a U.S. military presence there.

To substantiate its case for U.S.-Soviet rivalry, Peking has cited remarks of Secretary Schlesinger and former Naval Operations Chief Zumwalt on the need for expanded U.S. combat forces in Europe and for greater international naval power against suspected Soviet advances. Peking has also carefully taken note of the slow pace of European security talks and MBFR negotiations and reported U.S. and allied statements during the talks and at NATO meetings expressing determination to resist Soviet goals in Europe. As evidence of U.S. Congressional opposition to Moscow, NCNA on 21 December reported Congress' restrictions on Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR for developing its energy industry. The report discreetly avoided portraying the restrictions as a rebuff to Ford Administration detente policies, but asserted that it upset "the smug calculation of the Soviet revisionists."

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PEKING MOVES TO CAPITALIZE ON THAI REPEAL OF TRADE BAN

Peking's high-level attention to a visiting Thai trade delegation, the first official Thai group to visit China in almost a year, has pointed up Chinese interest in more rapidly normalizing relations in the wake of Thailand's recent repeal of its long-standing ban on trade with the PRC. The delegation, headed by Thai Deputy Minister of Commerce Prasong Sukhum, had a "friendly" meeting with PRC economic chief Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and also held talks with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. Underlining the political aspect of the talks, the deputy leader of the Thai delegation was Anand Panyarachun, Bangkok's permanent UN representative.

Following the first visit of a Thai delegation to Peking in September 1972, relations had seemed to be developing smoothly, but they reached an impasse early this year as the Thai National Assembly refused to lift the ban on China trade. After the 6 December Thai repeal of the ban, Peking promptly signaled its approval with sharply increased coverage for routine Chinese "people's" delegations visiting Thailand. Whereas Peking coverage for such groups earlier in the year had been generally restricted to bland recitations of their itineraries, an 8 December NCNA report quoted the Thai deputy foreign minister as envisaging that the development of various contacts "will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations," during a talk with a visiting Chinese basketball team. A Peking broadcast in Thai on 12 December quoted Thai Air Chief Marshal Thawi as making an "admirable statement" on the permanency of Thai-Chinese friendship during the course of a banquet address for a Chinese soccer team.

REACTION FROM THAI
CLANDESTINE RADIO

In contrast to Peking's upbeat approach, the PRC-based clandestine radio station Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) has responded to the trade ban repeal with a review of the Thai government's long-standing opposition to the PRC and the claim that the repeal resulted from the Thai "people's persistent struggle." A 19 December VOPT broadcast characterized the delay in repealing the ban over the past year as proof that the Sanya government tried to delay the bill as long as possible." It concluded by noting that the Sanya government has already passed another law and set up an agency to "monopolize and control" PRC trade so as to "make profits from such activity." The broadcast castigated the government for continuing to restrict the people's freedom to trade with and to visit the PRC.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRC SIGNALS REVIVED CORDIALITY IN RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA

An unusually effusive speech by Yao Wen-yuan at a Peking banquet given by the Albanian ambassador on 20 December has capped evidence of improved Sino-Albanian relations, apparent since last month when Yao led a delegation to Albania's 30th anniversary celebrations. Yao's visit and the banquet--held in honor of the anniversary delegation--indicate that the rift between the two countries which apparently resulted from improved Sino-U.S. relations, has been healed. At the banquet, which was attended by several active members of the PRC Politburo, Yao noted that he had already reported to the PRC leadership on his visit and talks with Albanian leaders, and that "Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai and other leading comrades of our party Central Committee. . . were all elated that our visit has enhanced the revolutionary unity and militant friendship between our two parties, two countries, and two peoples."

Referring to his substantive discussions in Albania, Yao said that they were conducted in an "extremely cordial and friendly" atmosphere and that the two sides had reached "complete unanimity in our views." This marked the first time in several years that Peking has publicly reported unanimity with any of its communist allies. Yao topped his presentation with unusual praise for Albanian Party Chairman Hoxha, adding to the standard Chinese characterization of Hoxha as "the great leader of the Albanian people" the notation that he is also the "close friend of the Chinese people."

Following Peking's opening to Washington and its concurrent stress on the USSR as the world's "most dangerous enemy," PRC media dropped some of their more demonstrative affirmations of friendship with Albania. Signs of disagreement had even occasionally surfaced, as in November 1972 during the Albanian anniversary festivities, when the visiting Albanian defense minister (now purged) differed publicly with his Chinese hosts by stating the view that each superpower "is as dangerous as the other."* By contrast, NCNA coverage of the anniversary this year avoided signs of friction, and expressions of mutual agreement reappeared during Yao's visit.

* For background on the dispute see the TRENDS of 8 November 1972, pages 19-20, and of 29 November 1972, pages 20-21.

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Peking notably gave the anniversary a higher-level and more effusive treatment than the authoritative Chinese commemoration of Romania's 30th anniversary last August.* Yao ranks above Li Hsien-nien, who led PRC delegates to Bucharest, and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying headed the turnout at the Albanian ambassador's reception instead of Teng Hsiao-ping, who has lower party rank and who headed the group at the Romanian reception. NCNA reported in August that the Chinese delegates' meeting with Ceausescu took place in a "very cordial and friendly atmosphere," while Yao's talks with Hoxha were described by NCNA with extraordinary hyperbole, as taking place in "a very warm, cordial, sincere and friendly atmosphere."

* For PRC coverage of the Romanian anniversary, see the TRENDS of 28 August 1974, pages 9-10.

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CHINA

NEW YEAR'S EDITORIAL FOCUSES ON IDEOLOGICAL STUDY, PRODUCTION

For the third year in a row, the New Year's Day editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, carried by NCNA on 31 December, has focused on domestic affairs. In reviewing 1974 achievements and setting forth tasks for the new year, the editorial did not call for any major shifts in line; rather it stressed the need for continued strengthening of party leadership over the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius and for increasing production. The editorial appeared to confirm that excesses in the ideological campaign slowed economic growth for a time early in 1974, as it failed to make a definite production claim for the year, stating only that the total value of industrial and agricultural output "shows a fresh increase over 1973." Last year's editorial had claimed an over eight percent combined increase in industrial and agricultural output over 1972. This year's editorial did not even mention the possible convening of the long-delayed National People's Congress (NPC), failing to reaffirm last year's call for achievements to greet the fourth NPC. This omission appears to signal that serious disagreements still plague the PRC leadership.

In listing tasks for the new year, the editorial called for intensifying work in national defense construction, specifically urging greater efforts "to run national defense industries well." This new theme may indicate that the ideological movement has even affected the protected defense industry. It may also mean that the continuing dispute over military allocations, which usually surfaces only in obscure historical references, has been resolved in favor of somewhat greater defense effort. The editorial clearly states, however, that no major change in economic priorities is contemplated, saying that the national economic plan must continue to be arranged "in the order of agriculture-light industry-heavy industry."

Noting that "revolution has pushed production forward," the editorial urged "deep and thorough criticism" of Lin Biao and Confucius. It stressed the need for study rather than struggle, instructing cadres to carry out further criticism by deepening the study of the "historical experience" of the struggle between Confucian and Legalist schools, a stipulation that would seem to allow the ideological campaign to continue without affecting conditions necessary for economic gains in the new year.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS Giving even less attention to foreign affairs than last year's brief treatment, the editorial once again advocated a continuation of the successes of Peking's flexible diplomacy under the banner of Mao's "Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs" while offering general support for international revolution. The "favorable" development of "world disorder," caused by the intensifying contradictions between the Third World and the superpowers, and between the superpowers themselves, was again portrayed as the salient feature of the present age. The increased stature of the Third World during the past year was acknowledged in its designation as "the main force" in the struggle against the superpowers. Like last year's editorial, this one differentiated between the two superpowers by listing the Soviet Union ahead of the United States, and it endorsed recent emphasis within China on the study of international affairs, calling on the people to pay particular attention to developing superpower contention and to the current economic crisis of world capitalism. The editorial briefly reaffirmed Peking's resolve to liberate Taiwan, but it dropped last year's characterization that it is Peking's "sacred duty" to liberate Taiwan.

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U S S R

NEW PASSPORT LAW RETAINS BARRIERS TO FARM LABOR DRAIN

The new system of internal passports announced in the press on 25 December appears to retain the present restrictions on peasant movement, despite current press assertions to the contrary. Although the withholding of passports from kolkhozniks has recently been publicly criticized by economists and sociologists, the growing shortage of skilled farm labor caused by continuing desertion of the farms apparently has dissuaded the leadership from removing this artificial barrier to migration.

Officials and scholars have been debating whether there is a surplus of labor on the farm, whether further migration of farm labor to city industry is desirable, and what measures--"administrative" (denial of passports), socioeconomic (improved living conditions) or organizational (better forms of labor organization)--are most effective in holding labor on the farm.

Most directly concerned with the problem is Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy, who has been working hard to stem migration, fighting for large investments in better rural living conditions and higher farm wages to hold labor on the farm. Although he has taken no public stand on the passport issue, he clearly would oppose anything which would facilitate migration. Polyanskiy recently highlighted the labor problem by calling a late November national conference on insuring an adequate supply of farm equipment operators, at which he declared that there was an "acute shortage" of tractor, truck and equipment operators and stressed the need to find ways to hold labor on the farm.

NEW STATUTE ANNOUNCED The new statute on the passport system was spelled out in a 28 August Council of Ministers decree, which was published only in the official bulletin of the council, THE COLLECTED DECREES OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT. Although the statute stated that all citizens over 16 are supposed to have passports, the decree excepted rural residents "who formerly were not issued passports." Instead of automatically receiving passports as city residents do, they will be issued passports only when they leave their home for over 45 days--assuming they are given permission to do so by local authorities. Under the previous regulations, most kolkhozniks were not issued passports; since registration of passports is required for travel, they were thereby legally prevented from leaving their farms.

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When this new statute was finally announced in the press 4 months later--on 25 December--the press and radio reports and comment stated that passports would be issued to all citizens over 16 years of age but glossed over the restrictive conditions affecting peasants. Especially misleading was Minister of Internal Affairs N. A. Shchelokov's 26 December PRAVDA explanation, which implied that rural residents would now be given the same rights as city residents. The "main thing," he said, is that "uniform legal passport practice is being introduced for all citizens of the country regardless of where they live--in the city or in the village--or where they work--in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, at a plant or in an institution"--and "the operation of uniform rules" for all citizens is "the most essential feature" of the new system.

DEBATE OVER PASSPORT SYSTEM Arguments over the issue of whether kolkhozniks should be given passports have been appearing in articles and books by demographers and sociologists for some time. A 1970 book by a group of Novosibirsk sociologists led by Academy of Sciences member T. I. Zaslavskaya supported the present limitations on kolkhozniks, while a 1972 book by V. I. Staroverov of the Institute of Sociological Research criticized the present restrictions. The sharpest attacks on the system were made by the country's best known demographer, V. I. Perevedentsev, a senior scientific worker at the Institute of the International Workers Movement, in articles in the November 1972 and January 1974 issues of the literary journal OUR CONTEMPORARY.

Perevedentsev condemned the withholding of passports from most kolkhozniks not only because it was a bureaucratic nuisance and hindrance to migration but because it was basically ineffective as well. According to an August 1973 NOVY MIR review of recent writings by Perevedentsev, he had calculated that while 2.95 million rural machinery operators had been trained from 1965 to 1968, over 2.5 million operators had left the village during the same period. In his November 1972 article he contended that as long as industry desperately needed new workers, subterfuges would be found to enable kolkhozniks to evade the regulations and take city jobs.

Perevedentsev argued, moreover, that the present system even stimulated migration. Passports are issued to everyone except peasants at age 16. Since farm girls knew they would not receive passports if they remained on the farms, they tended to transfer to city schools in large numbers at age 15. (This migration did not involve boys, since they receive passports when inducted into the army and can refuse to return to the village after demobilization.) Thus, in his January 1974 article, Perevedentsev called the desire for a passport one of the main factors drawing youths to the city.

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Furthermore, Perevedentsev argued that it was misleading to speak about labor shortages in the countryside, since many areas have surplus labor. In the November 1972 OUR CONTEMPORARY, he stated that "there is no justification for saying that too many people are leaving the village," arguing that the city needed the excess population. In fact, if migration suddenly ceased, he wrote, "society would be forced to adopt measures to encourage the transfer of rural inhabitants to cities," since migration is one of the most important conditions for further economic development. In his January 1974 article, Perevedentsev wrote that the granting of passports to all peasants would be "extremely advantageous" from the standpoint both of agriculture and the effective use of labor resources.

POLYANSKIY'S APPROACH
CHALLENGED

The implication of disagreement with Polyanskiy's approach contained in these arguments of Perevedentsev is reinforced by his challenge to other agricultural policies closely associated with Polyanskiy. Polyanskiy has long argued for the investment of large sums to build new rural housing, cultural and other non-productive facilities and has pushed a program of building thousands of new modern villages to which peasants would be moved en masse--a survival of Khrushchev's old "agrogorod" scheme. In the November 1972 OUR CONTEMPORARY, Perevedentsev declared that the idea of building "nice clubhouses" and moving peasants to new modern villages in order to halt or regulate migration is "naive." In his January 1974 article he criticized supporters of "agrogorods" and "liquidators" of old villages, ridiculing the program of building new villages, which he said would be fantastically expensive.

In contrast to Polyanskiy's approach, Perevedentsev argued that better organization of labor is the key to holding farm laborers, especially youths, on the farm. Taking an approach similar to that of Polyanskiy's old rival, Voronov, Perevedentsev argued in his November 1972 article that job dissatisfaction is the main motive for deserting the farm, that "regulation of rural migration should be sought in labor and its organization," and that youths seek a sense of responsibility and participation in decision making and will migrate if they feel like "hired workers." In the January 1974 article, he made these recommendations more specific by advocating the "link" form of agricultural organization. This would kill two birds with one stone, he implied. Besides providing an incentive for keeping the best youth on the farm, it would make others superfluous and thus available for city jobs.

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CRISIS OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR The growing shortage of machine operators caused by migration was highlighted at a 27-29 November national conference in Kirovograd. The long 1 December RURAL LIFE account of Polyanskiy's speech at the conference reported him saying that the big increase in agricultural machinery production had not been matched by growth in the number of operators, resulting in a current "acute shortage" of operators. He declared that in the last 8 years the number of tractors and combines has increased by 700,000, while the numbers of operators had grown by only 330,000; he indicated that truck drivers were in similarly short supply. Moreover, he stated, by 1980 farms will need twice as many operators as at present. Thus, the gains expected from the increased investments in agricultural equipment production won by Brezhnev and Polyanskiy in long struggles over priorities would be lost for lack of operators.

As remedies, Polyanskiy focused on training more operators and holding them on the farms, and identified the "main reasons" for their desertion as lack of attention by farm leaders, lack of good production, cultural and living conditions, and lack of material and moral incentives. He stressed measures to return demobilized soldiers to their villages as one of the main solutions to the shortage. As usual, he said nothing about the possible value in this regard of new forms of labor organization.

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GUATEMALA

MOSCOW, BLOC ALLIES PROTEST DEATH OF PGT LEADERS

The discovery of the body of Humberto Alvarado Arellano, Secretary General of the communist Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), near Guatemala City on 22 December and the later announcement that two other PGT leaders had been killed evoked a strong protest from the CPSU Central Committee and similar reactions from communist party leaders in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Havana, which has had past differences with the PGT, has not yet issued a formal protest, but the Cuban media have deplored Alvarado's "cruel assassination" by "Guatemala's repressive forces."

BACKGROUND Alvarado died under unclear circumstances following a clash between police and kidnappers, reportedly led by Alvarado, who had collected ransom for a local businessman they held captive. Alvarado's party has operated illegally for the past 20 years, since the overthrow of the leftist Arbenz government in 1954. The party had strained relations with Castro in the late 1960's when the Cuban premier backed a guerilla-led splinter group which criticized party leadership. However, in spite of the PGT's ambivalent attitude toward terrorism--which Moscow generally opposes in Latin America--the party has usually enjoyed the support of Moscow.* Thus a 29 September PRAVDA article, hailing the party's 25th anniversary, praised the struggle against the "savage terror" of Guatemala's authoritarian regime and the party's close relations with international communism and the "working people" of the Soviet Union.

MOSCOW COMMENT The CPSU Central Committee statement, as reported by TASS on the 26th, condemned the "criminal murder" of Humberto Alvarado as a "new heinous crime" committed by "Guatemala's repressive organs." The statement also recalled that "Guatemalan reaction" had murdered former PGT Secretary General Bernardo Alvarado Monson in 1972 and expressed the Central Committee's "fraternal solidarity" with the difficult

* For a discussion of the Castro-PGT clash, see the TRENDS of 15 February 1968, pages 6-10. The Soviet Union's uncertain response to the murder of FRG Ambassador Karl von Spreti by Guatemalan guerrillas is examined in the TRENDS of 8 April 1970, pages 22-23.

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struggle waged by the PGT. On 27 December Jose Miguel Vara's Spanish-language commentary on Moscow Radio, which painted a fuller picture of the milieu in which the PGT operated, stated that repressions against the party began soon after Arbenz was ousted by a military force "financed and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency." A 28 December TASS dispatch reported the joint declaration by Latin American communist party leaders deploring the murder of Alvarado and two other colleagues said to have been killed by police. The Latin communist leaders' report also mentioned the CIA, noting that it "supported and encouraged" the "extermination campaign" by Guatemalan reactionaries against the communists.

CC STATEMENTS BY The central committees of the communist
BLOC PARTIES parties in Berlin, Prague and Sofia were
 quick to follow the Soviet lead, and all
issued short statements condemning Alvarado's death within
3 days after the CPSU statement was reported. Yugoslavia's
TANJUG, one of the more active East European news services in
covering Latin American events, had reported the LCY Central
Committee's communique deploring the death of the Guatemalan
communist on 26 December, shortly before TASS announced the
CPSU statement.

HAVANA REPORTS Although Cuba did have a rapprochement with
 the PGT and other Soviet-oriented Latin
parties in the early 70's, Havana's official reaction to Alvarado's
death was the most low-key response by any communist country
reporting the event. No statements by government officials or
the Cuban Communist Party have been reported, and Havana has
not yet announced expressions of condolences, such as the CPSU
Central Committee and central committees of some other Bloc
countries sent to their counterparts in the PGT. On the 25th,
however, Havana international service's Our America commentary
did condemn the "assassination" of Alvarado, who was praised
as a "distinguished intellectual and communist leader." The
commentary noted that Alvarado had lived in exile most of the
time since Arbenz was overthrown by "mercenary forces" trained
and supported by the CIA. On the 28th PRENSA LATINA also
report that the PGT had issued a party bulletin which charged
that reactionary forces in the Guatemalan army and police force
had arrested and murdered Alvarado and two other PGT leaders
who were not identified. The Havana regime, whose response to
events is often less systematic than that of Moscow, may have
further comment at a later date.

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NOTE

MOSCOW ON CIA: Moscow has reacted promptly to U.S. news reports and public comment concerning alleged illegal spying activities by CIA against U.S. citizens. TASS and Moscow radio have carried reports to various audiences noting developments in the affair. The reports have been basically straightforward, although colored by tendentious selection and editorial interpolations. Senator Proxmire was reported as having "confirmed" the press allegations, and Congressman Harrington was reported as having detailed the "dark affairs" of the CIA. Sensationalism was particularly marked in a Moscow domestic radio account on 25 December and in a commentary broadcast on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress for the Arab world on the 28th. The domestic service item said that "spying and the stifling of the civil liberties of the population have become an integral feature of the American way of life"; Radio Peace and Progress focused on former CIA Director and present Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms, accusing him of having "personally directed the downfall of the legitimate government of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 - 29 DECEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2425 items)</u>		<u>Peking (818 items)</u>	
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik in USSR	(--)	Vietnam	(8%) 7%
[Gromyko Speeches	(--)	[30th VPA Anniver-	(5%) 4%]
Supreme Soviet Session	(13%) 4%	sary	
		[PRC-PRG Economic	(--)
		Aid Agreement	2%]
		USSR	(3%) 5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.